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GENERAL SLOBODAN PRALJAK’S 
HONORABLE DEFIANCE 
In Memory of General Slobodan Praljak 
, 
Michael G. Karnavas 
 
Having listened to the summary of the Appeal Judgment and 
having stood up to hear the litany of crimes affirmed by the 
Appeals Chamber before his sentence of 20 years was 
upheld, General Slobodan Praljak took his own life by 
drinking poison – but not before expressing his utter 
contempt for the Judgment, and by extension, his contempt 
for the Judges and the ICTY as a judicial institution. 
Questions abound. How did General Praljak smuggle the 
vial of poison into the courtroom? How could he have gotten 
it through the numerous check-points where he would have 
been searched? Did he have it on him when he arrived at 
the ICTY? Did someone smuggle it to him there? Or, was it 
waiting for him at the ICTY, secretly planted in his cell or in 
the toilet? 
                     
 With permission of the author, we take the text from his blog:: 
http://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2017/12/05/praljaks-defiance/ 
 Michael G. Karnavas is an American trained lawyer. He is 
licensed in Alaska and Massachusetts and is qualified to appear 
before the various International tribunals, including the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Residing and practicing 
primarily in The Hague, he is recognized as an expert in 
international criminal defence,  including,  pre-trial, trial, and 
















































Relevant as these questions are, few are asking what I think 
is perhaps the more important question: why did General 
Praljak take his life? 
General Praljak had spent about a dozen years in the United 
Nations Detention Unit (UNDU). With credit for the time 
served, he would have been eligible for early release within 
two to three years, and would very likely have been released 
before serving his full sentence. 
But detention never troubled General Praljak. Unlike the 
other accused in his case, he refused to be provisionally 
released under house arrest. It was a matter of principle. 
And when it came to his principles, he was stubbornly 
uncompromising. His argument would be: if I am presumed 
innocent, if I voluntarily came to the ICTY upon hearing of 
my indictment, if the Croatian government was offering a 
guarantee for my return to the ICTY, if my every movement 
while on provisional release in Zagreb will be shadowed by 
the police, and if I have complied with the conditions of my 
provisional release in the past, then why should I now be 
under house arrest as a condition of my provisional release? 
Of course, he wanted to be in his home with his wife, 
children, and grandchildren who he adored, and who adored 
him. But it was the principle of it – a principle he was willing 
to adhere to, come hell or high water. And for that I admired 
General Praljak. He unsentimentally walked his talk. 
Reflecting on General Praljak’s final moments, I believe it 
was his principles that drove him to take his own life – not 
fear, not anger, not depression, not desperation, and 
certainly not any of the other reasons that cause a person to 
seek peace through suicide. 
General Praljak was no romantic fool; he did not harbor 
illusions that his conviction would be overturned. Any 
objective observer would have come to the same 
conclusion. I certainly did. At best, the Appeals Chamber 
might have reduced the sentences, but the convictions, for 
the most part, would stand, even though, in my opinion, the 
evidence does not support the factual findings and legal 
conclusions made by the Trial Chamber. This is particularly 
so with the claim in the indictment of an overarching joint 
criminal enterprise (JCE) to reconstitute the Croatian 
Banovina within its 1939 borders, so it could either join 
Croatia or be an independent state within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) with close ties to Croatia – and that this 








































 Bosnian Muslims and other non-Croats who lived in these 
areas. 
Convicted persons on appeal, generally, are susceptible to 
irrational hope, unsubstantiated rumors of behind-the-
scenes machinations of friendliness and supposed efforts to 
steer the judges in a favorable direction, or false claims of 
exoneration (usually couched in language that is sufficiently 
vague to allow plausible deniability) – claims that are 
sometimes peddled by charlatans posing as high-powered 
lawyers seeking to make a quick (and exorbitant) fee. 
General Praljak had no patience for any such nonsense. 
General Praljak was rational, intelligent, and pragmatic. His 
thinking was shaped by the hard sciences, even though he 
was equally versed in the soft sciences or liberal arts of 
philosophy, sociology, history, literature, theater, and 
cinema. Though I am assuming that General Praljak hoped 
and perhaps expected (as my client, Dr. Jadranko Prlić, did) 
that he would get a fair trial at the ICTY, it should have been 
obvious to him either before arriving at the UNDU, or 
sometime shortly thereafter, that convictions on most of the 
alleged crimes were predestined. 
General Praljak (and the other accused) should have been 
disabused of any thoughts of justice and a fair trial. Maybe 
because hope springs eternal we all, including General 
Praljak, clung to some vestige of expectation that the 
accused would have an opportunity to set the record 
straight. General Praljak certainly wanted to. He spared no 
time or expense to bring to light evidence that he believed 
was contextually relevant for the trial Judges to understand 
and appreciate, among other things: 
 What it was like to be in his shoes; 
 what he did and why; 
 what he did not do or could not have done; 
 what the Croatian Community (and later Republic) of 
Herceg Bosna was all about; 
 the dire predicament the Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) found themselves in and the 
imperative to react with all deliberate speed and 
purpose; and 
 Croatia’s generosity in helping the Muslims of  BiH 
at a time when Croatia was one-third occupied and 
















































Yugoslavia and its highly trained and armed 
Yugoslav People’s Army. 
General Praljak’s expectations – as legitimate as they were 
– were not met to any degree of satisfaction. I know, 
because since early 2005 I represented Dr. Prlić in this case. 
He too harbored expectations of a fair trial – as all accused 
appearing before any judicial institution should, especially 
when being tried at a tribunal founded by the United Nations. 
Granted, I may not be the most objective observer, and it 
can be claimed that I have a considerable interest in this 
case, which consumed over 12 years of my career. Be that 
as it may, I can say with full responsibility that what I 
witnessed during the trial was a parody, a charade, theater 
of the absurd disguised as a trial. Everyone who was at the 
ICTY saw it. As I repeatedly complained to the Judges 
during the trial, none of them, nor any of the Judges at the 
ICTY, would want to be tried in the way my client was being 
tried. 
If there is one case, one trial, and now, one appeal that 
stands out as part of the dark legacy of the ICTY, it is Prlić 
et al. It is a textbook example of how not to try a case, how 
not to select the panel of trial judges, how not to conduct the 
trial proceedings, how not to analyze the evidence, and how 
not to draft a judgment. It is also a textbook example of why 
convicted persons cannot and should not expect that the 
errors and sins of the Trial Chamber will be exposed with 
unrelenting precision, brutal honesty, and unvarnished 
integrity, especially when to do so would require the Appeals 
Chamber to reexamine virtually the entire record (in this 
case, 52,967 pages of trial transcripts, 818 written decisions, 
and 5,926 exhibits admitted over five years of trial 
proceedings). But that is exactly what the Appeals Chamber 
should have done in Prlić et al. – especially when the 
Defense handed them the needles of errors hidden in the 
massive haystack of a record. 
How naïve it was to think that the result of this case would 
have been any different! The ICTY – as a judicial institution 
– had already adjudicated many of the alleged major issues 
confronting the accused in Prlić et al., such as whether the 
Muslim-Croat conflict in BiH was an international armed 
conflict, whether Croatian President Tuđman and his 
government were attempting to carve up BiH, whether the 
Croats in BiH set up a statelet that would either be 
autonomous or part of Croatia, and whether there was ethnic 








































 have been part of some grand scheme, a master criminal 
plan, a JCE. 
Though I may not be the most objective observer (as I have 
already noted), I am convinced beyond doubt based on the 
evidence submitted during the trial that there was no JCE, 
no statelet, no efforts to carve up BiH, and no ethnic 
cleansing, etc. I fully recognize that errors were made, that 
serious crimes were committed against soldiers and citizens, 
and that there must be accountability. But as far as the 
prosecution’s overarching theory that there was a JCE to 
reconstitute the Croatian Banovina within its 1939 borders, 
and that ethnic cleansing occurred to achieve this goal, I 
simply do not see anything more than, at best, circumstantial 
evidence that points to this as just one of many inferences 
that can be drawn. 
Others, no doubt, see it differently. Fair enough. But can it 
honestly be said that the Judges of the Trial Chamber or the 
Appeals Chamber were not, at least to some degree, 
predisposed to find the existence of the overarching JCE as 
claimed by the prosecution, and resultantly, that this would 
not spill over into a determination of guilt, when the ICTY 
website, out reach material, and exhibition posters depicted 
the narrative below (or a variation of it) before, during, and 
after the trial, and while the appeal was pending: 
The republic’s [BiH’s] strategic position made it subject to 
both Serbia and Croatia attempting to assert dominance 
over large chunks of its territory. In fact, the leaders of 
Croatia and Serbia had in 1991 already met in a secret 
meeting where they agreed to divide up Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, leaving a small enclave for Muslims. 
… Bosnian Croats soon followed, rejecting the authority 
of the Bosnian Government and declaring their own 
republic with the backing of Croatia. The conflict turned 
into a bloody three-sided fight for territories, with civilians 
of all ethnicities becoming victims of horrendous crimes. 
In light of these claimed facts on the ICTY website, can it be 
said that the accused in Prlić et al. truly enjoyed the 
presumption of innocence? For years this text has been part 
of the ICTY narrative for public consumption. It was not 
drafted by accident. Nor is it likely that it was posted and 
paraded about without the express approval of the 
presidents of the ICTY. Incidentally, sitting on the Appeals 
















































Theodor Meron and Judge Fausto Pocar) and the current 
president, Judge Carmel Agius. 
This narrative invariably served as the subtext during the 
trial. How could it not? When reflecting on how the trial was 
conducted and how some of the accused were treated 
(especially General Praljak, who was not shyin expressing 
his opinion), it is clear as crystal from day one that none of 
the accused in Prlić et al. stood much chance of a fair trial 
and a just outcome. Questions or comments that came from 
some of the Judges displayed a pro-prosecution bias, such 
as calling the Croatian Defence Council the “Catholic army.” 
Occasionally, the Judges commented on the evidence, 
prejudging it based on their supposed personal 
knowledge.1 The list goes on. 
In our Appeal Brief filed on behalf of Dr. Prlić, Ms. Suzana 
Tomanović and I argued that Dr. Prlić was denied a fair trial 
and that the Trial Judgment was profoundly flawed with legal 
and factual errors, because the Trial Chamber facilitated a 
confirmation bias by: 
 failing to consider and assess all relevant evidence 
admitted into the record, instead opting to 
systematically rely on selective evidence that 
distorted the truth and led to false conclusions 
(Ground 1); 
 disregarding the testimony of virtually all of Dr. 
Prlić’s witnesses, sprinkling the names of his 
witnesses throughout the Trial Judgment and citing 
them on inconsequential matters to create an 
appearance of having considered them (Ground 2); 
 failing to make specific findings on documentary 
evidence it purported to assess, for example, 
claiming to have considered all documentary 
evidence admitted by written motion in the context of 
the evidence submitted, without specifying which 
documents it gave little or no weight and the 
reasons as to why it did so (Ground 3); 
 relying on uncorroborated hearsay from the Mladić 
Diaries, while denying Dr. Prlić the opportunity to 
tender excerpts from the Mladić Diaries and/or 
present vivavoce testimony in response to the 
hearsay admitted (Ground 5); 
                     
1 Seee.g. Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., IT-04-74-T, Transcript, 10 May 








































  failing to properly assess prosecution lay and expert 
witnesses and failing to provide a reasoned opinion 
as to their credibility; (Grounds 4 and 6); and 
 systematically denying Dr. Prlić adequate time and 
facilities to question critical witnesses and present 
essential evidence by applying a one-sixth-solution: 
all six defense teams would collectively have the 
same time for cross-examination as the prosecution 
would have for direct examination for each witness 
(Ground 7). 
And so, it was deeply disappointing, indeed shocking, to 
hear Judge Agius read the summary that was carefully 
crafted for public consumption (since few, if any, will read 
the 1400-page Appeal Judgment) stating that Dr. Prlić’s sole 
fair trial right claim was that he was “systematically denied 
adequate time and facilities to question witnesses.” Whoever 
wrote that summary for his Honor was clearly ignorant of the 
details of the appeal. 
These mischaracterizations of the fair trial errors raised by 
Dr. Prlić in his brief are simply propaganda. They lead to the 
intended consequence of facilitating a fictitious perception in 
the public’s mind that, save for this belly-aching claim of not 
having enough time to present his case – something that is 
too amorphous and imperceptible for the public to fully 
appreciate – Dr. Prlić was content with how the evidence he 
presented was assessed. 
The Appeals Chamber’s summary remarks concerning the 
Mladić Diaries are equally as hollow, reflecting an 
economical use of the facts. The Appeals Chamber claims 
that: 
Prlić never unconditionally requested that his case be 
reopened and, in any event, the Trial Chamber expressly 
permitted him to admit evidence to rebut these diary 
extracts, which he did. General Praljak was likewise 
offered an opportunity to challenge these extracts. 
This mischaracterizes the record. After the close of 
evidence, the prosecution sought to reopen its case to 
tender into evidence excerpts from the Mladić Diaries, which 
were found in Mladić’s residence in Belgrade by the Serbian 
authorities. In response, Ms. Suzana Tomanović and I 
argued that the prosecution’s case should not be reopened, 
but if reopened, Dr. Prlić should be afforded an equal right to 
reopen his case and have admitted excerpts of the Mladić 
















































to logic and common sense for us to open the door and 
move for the Mladić Diaries to be admitted without the 
prosecution’s motion being granted. But, seeing as how the 
prosecution’s excerpts were coming in (the Mladić Diaries 
were newly discovered evidence), we requested the Trial 
Chamber on several occasions to admit excerpts relevant to 
Dr. Prlić’s defense. How many times should the same 
request be made before it can be considered 
“unconditional”? 
This was only one of the issues raised by Dr. Prlić. Not that I 
wish to relitigate the point, but some sunshine on one 
particular entry in the Mladić Diaries is worth examining. You 
be the judge as to whether this is how a reason able trier off 
act should admit, assess, and rely on uncorroborated 
hearsay evidence. 
The Majority admitted and relied on excerpts from the Mladić 
Diaries, which contained quoted remarks purportedly 
attributed to General Praljak, inmaking JCE findings – 
excerpts that directly implicated Dr. Prlić. General Praljak’s 
statements are uncorroborated hearsay. Mladić did not 
testify. No prior testimony had been elicited concerning 
these meetings, and no witnesses testified to the meetings. 
General Praljak’s request to reopen his case and testify 
concerning the meetings with Mladić and the statements 
attributed to him in these extracts was denied. In denying his 
request, the Majority’s suggestion that General Praljak’s 
counsel vouch for General Praljak in the closing brief and 
testify during closing arguments in lieu of vivavoce testimony 
from General Praljak was absurd. Even law students know 
that counsel cannot testify and representations by counsel in 
closing briefs and closing arguments are not evidence. And 
what of Dr. Prlić’s right of confrontation, his right to question 
General Praljak on what he purportedly said or meant? 
These points may seem inconsequential, but I think not. 
Here is why. Even if the Appeal Judgment addresses all the 
fair trial right challenges raised by Dr. Prlić, that is beside the 
point. What is relevant is the false perception these 
segments of the summary read to the public created – 
intentions aside. 
And speaking of perceptions, anyone who witnessed the trial 
would attest to just how dysfunctional the Trial Chamber 
was, with two of the Judges often publicly quarrelling with 
the Presiding Judge, who seemed incapable of managing 
the trial proceedings. None of the Judges were up to the 








































 the parties were conducting their examinations led me to 
invite the Judges to either conduct the proceedings properly 
and in accordance with the letter and spirit of the ICTY 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (and 
refrain from inappropriately interfering as they had been 
doing), or to pack their bags and go home. And since they 
seemed clueless on how the proceedings should be 
conducted, I further requested that the Judges allow the 
prosecution and the defense one hour each to lecture them 
– since both the prosecution and defense had considerable 
experience in trying cases at the ICTY.
2
 Cheeky as this may 
seem, my request was granted, and submissions were 
made.
3
The proceedings improved somewhat after this 
intervention and training session, but overall, I can safely 
say that in my 35 years as a lawyer, the Prlić et al. trial was 
the absolute worst experience I’ve ever had as a lawyer. 
But why should this matter and how does it account for 
General Praljak taking his own life? 
It matters because, had the Trial Chamber been balanced 
and measured in their treatment of the defense, had they not 
adopted the unreasonable approach of allowing the six 
accused to have only a combined amount of time equal to 
the time allotted to the prosecution for every witness, had 
the Judges been more patient with General Praljak and 
allowed him greater latitude in questioning witnesses (after 
all he was in situ on the matters on which he wanted to 
confront the witnesses), had they not virtually wholesale 
ignored the defense evidence, and had they drafted a 
judgment that represented the evidence submitted during 
the five-year trial, then, perhaps he may have accepted the 
findings and conclusions. Perhaps, General Praljak might 
have accepted that he may have erred during the fog of war 
as he tried his best to command and control a citizen-soldier 
army led by a few professional officers of ranks that 
exceeded their experience and competence. 
I say this because of the time I spent getting to know 
General Praljak before the trial and observing him for over a 
decade as the case progressed through the trial, all the way 
up to his last day. General Praljak was fearless. He was not 
afraid to be held accountable for any acts of commission or 
omission – so long as the evidence bore out his 
                     
2 Prosecutor v. Prlić et al. ICTY-04-74-T, Transcript, 14 March 
2007, pp. 15628-33. 
3 Prosecutor v. Prlić et al. ICTY-04-74-T, Transcript, 22 March 
















































responsibility. He took the stand and testified for over three 
months. He did not equivocate, did not feign an absence of 
memory, and he certainly did not try to shift the blame. 
General Praljak did not suffer fools, perhaps because his 
intellect was off the charts, not because of a superiority 
complex or arrogance. At times, however, he could be 
contentious, vociferous, and cantankerous. He had an 
overwhelming presence bursting with energy and 
determination to expose what he knew, what he saw, and 
what he felt about the events he had experienced. 
Sometimes his exuberance to get to the truth or to set the 
record straight got the best of him as he would stray or get 
carried away, depending on the topic being discussed. 
Occasionally, he had difficulty seeing the trees for the forest. 
And yes, occasionally, he could be exasperatingly difficult to 
contain, just as he exasperatingly had difficulty containing 
himself when hearing nonsense masquerading as facts. 
If I have learned anything in representing accused in highly 
contentious and stressful trials, unless the judges are 
courteous, considerate, patient, and solicitous, an accused 
will be hard pressed to accept a ruling or final judgment, 
irrespective of the quality or sufficiency of the evidence. But 
when also factoring in how the case was tried, the way two 
of the Judges interacted with General Praljak, the way they 
often condescended to him, and of course, their ultimate 
findings and conclusions in the judgment and how these 
were reached, is it any wonder that General Praljak would 
challenge the even-handedness of the proceedings, or that 
he would reject the Trial and Appeal Judgments with 
contempt? 
General Praljak’s final act casts a long shadow over the 
factual findings and legal conclusions made by the Trial 
Chamber and upheld by the Appeals Chamber. The 
evidence, for the most part, is available for scrutiny for 
anyone interested in judging the Judgments. Of course, few, 
if any, will take the time to go over this material to see what 
is proved, what is speculative, what is true, and what is 
false. But no one should be gulled into imagining that 
General Praljak exited the field as a concession to and 
acceptance of the findings of his guilt, or because he feared 
continued incarceration. Rather, his sacrifice was the 
ultimate repudiation of the injustice with which he was tried 
and judged. 
Some will look at the Judgments in Prlić et al. and find 








































 reject them as General Praljak did, perhaps with an equal 
amount of contempt. But what is for sure is that these 
Judgments will not foster reconciliation any more than it can 
be claimed that they represent the historical truths of what 
happened in BiH during the Muslim-Croat conflict. 
I have profound respect for the Judges of the Appeals 
Chamber who rendered the Judgment. I also accept, as all 
must, that their Judgment is final. However, in good 
conscience, I cannot respect most of the findings and 
conclusions in the Appeal Judgment made by these 
esteemed Judges. My critique is not an attack on the ICTY 
as an institution; it is an indictment on the way the Trial 
Chamber conducted the proceedings in Prlić et al., resulting 
in a miscarriage of justice, which, regrettably, the Appeals 
Chamber failed to cure. And while it is claimed that counsel 
at the ICTY have “a positive obligation to protect the 
reputation of the Tribunal,”
4
 it would be cowardly of me and 
an affront to General Praljak’s memory to pretend the 
proceedings were fair, that there was no predisposition 
shown by the Judges during the trial or that the Trial and 
Appeal Judgments are not flawed. Some may try to twist 
these words as an assault on the ICTY’s reputation and 
legacy, but in the words of Voltaire, “To the living we owe 
respect, but to the dead we owe only the truth.”   
General Praljak’s suicide was an act of defiance that has 
shed light on the ICTY’s legacy. No amount of spin will erase 
the tragic event that occurred in Courtroom 1 on 29 
November 2017. What was expected to be the ICTY’s swan 
song – ending by reaffirming the convictions in Prlić et al. 
just days after the Mladić trial verdict – turned into a sad and 
confusing sight. General Praljak preferred to take his life, 
rather than validate the result of the trial and appeal 
proceedings – proceedings that in his view produced a false 
narrative based, in part, on the Judges’ unwillingness or 
inability to look beyond the settled orthodoxies that were 
touted on the ICTY website and peddled by its Outreach 
Program, even as the proceedings were ongoing. 
 




                     
4 In the Matter of Mr Toma Fila, IT-13-93-Misc.1, Decision of the 
Disciplinary Panel, 23 October 2012, para. 70. 
